Themes in the Economics of Aging by Michael D. Hurd & James P. Smith
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Themes in the Economics of Aging
Volume Author/Editor: David A. Wise, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-90284-6
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/wise01-1
Publication Date: January 2001
Chapter Title: Anticipated and Actual Bequests
Chapter Author: Michael D. Hurd, James P. Smith
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c10334
Chapter pages in book: (p. 357 - 392)Michael D. Hurd is a senior economist at RAND and a research associate of the National
Bureau of Economic Research. James P. Smith is a senior economist at RAND.
We gratefully acknowledge the expert programming assistance of David Rumpel and Iva
Maclennan and the very constructive suggestions of David Laibson and participants at the
NBER conference. Research support for this paper was provided by a grant from the Na-
tional Institute on Aging to RAND.

11
Anticipated and Actual Bequests
Michael D. Hurd and James P. Smith
11.1 Introduction
Important advances have recently been made in documenting the pro-
cess of wealth accumulation by households. Because of better data our
knowledge is rapidly increasing about the facts surrounding the distribu-
tion of household wealth and, to a lesser extent, household saving behav-
ior. However, this improved factual base has not yet been translated into
ad eeperu n derstanding of the theoretical reasons people save. The candi-
dates remain much the same (life-cycle timing, risk aversion, and be-
quests), but we appear to be no more certain about their relative impor-
tance. Advances in our understanding of bequest motives have been
particularly diﬃcult, in part due to the inherent diﬃculties in measuring
the bequests that individuals anticipate making and the inheritances that
they actually bequeath.
This paper will study the role of inheritances and bequests in shaping
household decisions on wealth accumulation. We will learn about bequests
by using new methods of measuring anticipated and actual bequests: We
will examine actual bequests made by individuals upon their deaths, and
compare them with their previously stated bequest intentions. Using panel
data with two measurements of subjective bequest probabilities, we will
357explore the reasons individuals might revise their bequest expectations.
These reasons may include, among other things, new information on
health or economic conditions of household members. Our results are
based on wealth, anticipated bequests, and actual bequests from two
waveso fthe Health and Retirement Study (HRS), and the Asset and
Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) study.
Because the paper uses two new types of data, considerable space will
be allocated to validation of them. In section 11.2 we outline a model of
consumption and saving behavior that will guide our analysis and provide
af r amework for the validation. Section 11.3 describes the data sets that
we will use. Section 11.4 examines the information from exit interviews
given by proxy respondents for 774 AHEAD respondents who died after
the baseline AHEAD survey. These exit interviews provide, among other
things, data about the medical and nonmedical costs associated with ill-
nesses of the respondents and the value and distribution of their estates.
We compare average bequests with average wealth in the baseline inter-
view, and we study how bequests covary with observable characteristics.
These analyses are consistent with the proxy reports’ being valid measures
of actual bequests.
In section 11.5 we discuss the theoretical and empirical properties of
ourm e asure of bequest expectations. If bequest expectations are valid pre-
dictors of actual bequests, they should evolve in a predictable way in a
population over time. The actual data conform to the predictions. Based
on predictions from the theoretical model of consumption and saving be-
havior, we then analyze panel data on changes at the individual level in
the subjective probability of leaving bequests. According to our results,
individuals revise their expectations of bequests appropriately in response
to new information. Having found the data on actual and anticipated be-
quests to be consistent with our expectations and theoretical predictions,
we use them in section 11.6 to construct an index of saving intentions. Our
results suggest that people plan to dissave before they die. Section 11.7 is
the conclusion and summary.
11.2 Model of Consumption and Saving
Our thinking about how to organize the data will be shaped by the life-
cycle model of consumption (LCH) as explicated in Yaari (1965) and Hurd
(1989) for singles and in Hurd (1999) for couples. The model has these
features and restrictions. The only uncertainty is the date of death. Re-
sources are bequeathable wealth and a stream of annuity income such as
Social Security, and annuity income cannot be borrowed against. Long-
lived individuals may use up their bequeathable wealth and then live solely
from annuity income, which would lead to a corner solution in the utility
maximization. The model allows for a bequest motive for saving.
358 Michael D. Hurd and James P. SmithWe outline the model for singles and discuss the implications for bequest
behavior. The model for couples, although substantially more complicated,
is in the same spirit, so we will give only some implications of it.
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The ﬁrst term is expected discounted utility from consumption:
u() the utility ﬂow from consumption;
the subjective time rate of discount;
at  the probability of being alive at t;a n d
N  the maximum age to which anyone can live (aN  0).
Thes econd term is the expected discounted utility of bequests:
V()  utility from bequests, which may depend on the economic status
of children as in an altruistic model or in a strategic bequest model;
wt  bequeathable wealth at t;a n d
mt  probability of dying at t.
Thec o nstraints on the maximization are
w0  initial bequeathable wealth that is given, and
wt  0∀ t is the nonnegativity constraint.
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in which
r  real interest rate (constant and known) and
At  ﬂow of annuities at time t.
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and w0 given. Here,
ut  marginal utility of consumption at time t,
ht  mt/at  mortality risk (mortality hazard), and
Vt  marginal utility of bequests at time t.
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bequeathable wealth has been consumed, and consumption equals annuity
income after T.
Suppose there is no bequest motive, which means that Vt  0i ne q u a -
tion (2). If r,( dut/dt)  0s ot h a t( dct/dt)  0p rovided u()i sc o n c a v e ,
and consumption will always decline with age. If r and ht is small, as
would be the case at young ages, (dut/dt)  0a nd consumption will in-
crease with age. At older ages, however, ht is approximately exponential so
that at some age ( in ﬁg. 11.1), ht 	r  0, and (dut/dt)  0a tt  .
For t  ,( dut/dt)  0a n d( dct/dt)  0.
Ac ondition on global utility maximization requires that if consumption
declines, wealth must also decline. Therefore a main implication of the
LCHi sthat bequeathable wealth will decline at suﬃciently advanced age.
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where w* t is the optimal wealth path. Under the assumption that there is
no bequest motive,s uchb equests will be accidental, but if individuals are
highly risk averse, bequests could be a large fraction of bequeathable
wealth.
If t so that wealth is declining with age, an increase in life expec-
Fig. 11.1 Life-cycle consumption and wealth paths
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bequests were there no behavioral response to the change in mortality risk:
Individuals consume more of their bequeathable wealth before they die.
If there is a behavioral response, however, bequests could increase: A de-
cline in mortality risk will ﬂatten the consumption path and reduce initial
consumption, causing more wealth to be held against the increased risk
of outliving resources. If wealth increases substantially, bequests could
increase.
Whether bequests increase or decrease depends on the shape of the new
optimal wealth path and the shape of the mortality curve {mt}.I ns imula-
tionsb ased on an estimated model for singles, Hurd (1992) found that
in baseline simulations, 20.7 percent of initial bequeathable wealth was
(accidentally) bequeathed; with an increase in life expectancy of about
three years, 16.5 percent was bequeathed when there was no behavioral
response, but 23.0 percent was bequeathed when there was a behavioral
response. The simulations were based on the constant relative risk aversion
(CRRA) in which u(c)  (c1	
)/(1 	
 ), with a rather low value of risk
aversion (
1.12), which implies a rather large behavioral response to
changes in mortality risk. Large values of 
 will reduce the behavioral re-
sponse to a reduction in mortality risk, so that larger values of 
 could lead
to little change or even a reduction in bequests.
An increase in the annuity stream also has an ambiguous eﬀect. If indi-
viduals are highly risk averse, consumption will change little in response
to the increase. Therefore, wealth will decline more slowly and, in ﬁgure
11.1, T will increase and bequeathable wealth will be greater. If mortality
risk is unchanged, bequests will be greater. However, in some circum-
stances, an increase in annuities could increase consumption enough that
the path of bequeathable declines relative to the base situation. This is
illustrated in ﬁgure 11.2. It can be shown analytically that this obtains
under the CRRA utility function (Hurd 1999), and simulations showed
that bequests decreased when annuity income was increased (Hurd 1993).
From the point of view of public policy it is important to understand
whether increases in Social Security beneﬁts are partly bequeathed back
to the younger generation, which would oﬀset someo fthe increase in taxes
required to fund the increase.
The eﬀecto fa ge on bequest probabilities is unambiguous in a stationary
environment. If the anticipated wealth path from time t onward is declin-
ing, leaving a bequest greater than b is the same as dying before age A*a s
shown in ﬁgure 11.3. If an individual survives until time t  1, he will have
followed the wealth path from t to t  1a nd he will still anticipate follow-
ing the same wealth path in future periods. Now, however, the probability
of surviving to age A*i sg r e a t e rb ecause, of course, the conditional proba-
bility of surviving to A* increases from t to t  1. Thus the probability of
leaving a bequest greater than b should decline as individuals age.
We have been discussing the situation in which there is no bequest mo-
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Fig. 11.2 The eﬀect of annuity level on consumption1. In this model, all of the wealth of the couple is transferred to the surviving spouse at
the death of one spouse. It is only at the death of the second spouse that wealth is inherited
by children or others.
tive for saving. A bequest motive means that Vt  0. At any given level of
wealth we would expect Vt to depend on the characteristics of the target
of the bequest. For example, if the children of an elderly person are well
oﬀ, Vt will be small because the marginal utility of additional wealth to
the children will be small. We would expect that if bequests are altruistic,
Vt will depend on the characteristics of all the children of the parent.
Ab equest motive ﬂattens the consumption path and reduces initial con-
sumption, causing more wealth to be held. If the probability of dying at
any age is unchanged, expected bequests will increase.
Tests of a bequest motive are of two types. The ﬁrst is based on a main
prediction of the life-cycle model: In the absence of a bequest motive,
bequeathable wealth should decline at suﬃciently advanced ages. Such
wealth decline has been found consistently in panel data sets (Hurd 1999).
It should be noted, however, that although a wealth increase is not consis-
tent with a life-cycle model that excludes a bequest motive, a wealth de-
cline is consistent with a life-cycle model that includes a bequest motive.
Thes econd type of test is based on variation in the rate of wealth change
as a function of covariates that are assumed to be related to the strength
of a bequest motive. Because most bequests are made to close relatives, it
is reasonable to assume that the number and characteristics of relatives
arer elated to the strength of a bequest motive. This thinking leads to a
comparison of the rates of wealth change among those with children to
those without children. A consistent ﬁnding is that there is little diﬀerence,
with the implication that any bequest motive for saving is weak on average
(Hurd 1987, 1989).
11.2.1 Life-Cycle Model of Consumption by Couples
Them odel for couples is similar to the model for singles: Couples have
au t ility function deﬁned over consumption while both spouses are alive,
and they get utility from contemplating “bequests.” However, there are two
typesofbequests:wealthtoasurvivingspouse,andwealthtoathirdperson
at the death of the surviving spouse.1 It is important to distinguish between
these two types of bequests because a bequest to a surviving spouse in-
creases only slightly the time horizon for decision making by the couple,
whereas a bequest to children can lengthen the planning horizon to many
generations. Furthermore, a spouse anticipating widowhood can aﬀect the
prior consumption decisions of the couple, but in most cases children
cannot.
Analysis similar to that for singles will show that a bequest motive (de-
siring to bequeath to someone outside the household) will ﬂatten the con-
sumption path and reduce initial consumption, causing more wealth to be
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adequately controlled.
held. Thus, expected bequests will increase. Of course, the eﬀects of
changes in life expectancy and changes in the annuity stream are ambigu-
ous, as they are in the case of singles.
Thed eath of a spouse should alter the bequest probabilities of the sur-
viving spouse for a number of reasons. The date at which the last spouse
is expected to die is reduced, and in the absence of any behavioral reaction
bequests should increase. The surviving spouse has high bequeathable
wealth relative to needs: If the couple had contemplated a declining wealth
path, the early death will cause bequests to increase. The annuity stream
of the household is typically altered because both Social Security and pen-
sion beneﬁts typically change at the death of a spouse. The surviving
spouse will reoptimize given the new situation, causing the path of be-
queathable wealth to diﬀer from what it would have been had the death oc-
curred later. The total eﬀecto nb equests is not obvious, and we will leave
it to be determined empirically.
11.2.2 Summary of Implications
When there is no bequest motive, at suﬃciently advanced olda g e sin-
dividuals will plan to dissave, and, therefore, the population will dissave
provided on average the anticipations of individuals are realized. With
increasing age wealth will decline and expected bequests will decline.
However, an unexpected reduction in survival probabilities causes diﬀer-
ent eﬀects from an expected reduction in survival chances that accompan-
ies aging: The unexpected reduction should cause a behavioral response,
which will make its eﬀecto nw e alth change ambiguous. Therefore, we
should ﬁnd in panel a reduction in anticipated bequests as the population
ages, but notn e c e s s a r i l yar e d uction in anticipated bequests as survival
chances vary at the individual level.
In cross-section, greater wealth should be associated with higher antici-
pated bequests even where there is no bequest motive. In panel there
should be no relationship between wealth change and anticipated bequests
as long as the observed wealth change is due to anticipated dissaving.2 An
unanticipated wealth change, however, should change anticipated be-
quests.
In cross-section, variation in annuity income such as pensions and So-
cial Security could aﬀect anticipated bequests,b u tthe sign of the eﬀect
depends on utility function parameters. In panel, anticipated changes in
annuity income will not change the wealth path and thus should not aﬀect
anticipated bequests. Unanticipated changes in annuity income act in the
same way as cross-section variation in annuity income, so the eﬀect on
anticipated bequests cannot be signed.
364 Michael D. Hurd and James P. Smith3. We cannot use wave 1 because the questions about anticipated bequests were not asked
in that wave.
Ab equest motive for saving requires only one substantive change to the
preceding summary: Wealth can increase with age (but does not have to),
evena ta dvanced old age. The other analyses of the diﬀerence between
anticipated and unanticipated changes in survival, wealth, and income
remain the same.
We will use two types of panel data to test implications of this model of
consumption and saving. The ﬁrst type will be information about actual
bequests, and the second will be about anticipated bequests.
11.3 Data
Our data come from the Asset and Health Dynamics among the Oldest
Old (AHEAD) study and from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
These studies are large panel surveys of individuals. They obtain exten-
sive information about the domains of health, economic status, family re-
lations, and labor market activity. AHEAD is representative of the popu-
lation born in 1923 or earlier and their spouses (Soldo et al. 1997). At
baseline in 1993 it obtained interviews from 8,222 persons who were ap-
proximately aged seventy or over. We will use information from the base-
line interview and from wave 2, which was ﬁelded in 1995. The HRS is
representative of the population born in the years 1931 through 1941 and
their spouses (Juster and Suzman 1995). At baseline in 1992 it interviewed
12,654 persons. We will use information from waves 2 and 3, which were
ﬁelded in 1994 and 1996.3
These surveys obtained extensive information about the economic situa-
tion of the households that were interviewed. Of particular importance for
this paper are the data on income and assets. The surveys asked for a
complete accounting of income and assets, and they used bracketing meth-
ods to reduce the rate of item nonresponse, resulting in economic data
of high quality. The surveys used innovative questions about subjective
probabilities to query individuals about their perceptions of their survival
chances and of leaving bequests. Respondents were asked about their
health in a number of ways. Here we use self-reports about health events
such as heart attack, cancer, diabetes, arthritis, stroke, high blood pres-
sure, and lung disease to ﬁnd the incidence of these conditions between
waveso fAHEAD and HRS.
11.4 Actual Bequests
Actual bequests are inherently diﬃcult to measure in the population and
frequently escape detection in traditional household surveys. Household
Anticipated and Actual Bequests 3654. For example, Mulligan (1995) reports that estate tax returns are ﬁled for only 5–10
percent of those who died after the age of forty-ﬁve. At the time of the AHEAD survey, the
threshold at which estate taxes start was $600,000 for an individual and as high as $1,200,000
foram a r r i ed couple.
5. AHEAD staﬀ estimate that they were able to conduct exit interviews with more than
90 percent of respondents who died between the ﬁrst and second waves.
surveys typically do not include any post-death interviews with relatives,
whichi sp robably the only feasible way to obtain information about be-
quests in the population. Therefore, most applied research on inheritances
has relied instead on estate records (David and Menchik 1985). While val-
uable, estate data can provide only a limited picture. Many inheritances are
below the estate tax thresholds and so do not appear in oﬃcial estate rec-
ords.Even when available, estate records provide very limited information
about the deceased person or about the actual and potential heirs.4
The AHEAD survey measured bequests by conducting an exit interview
following the death of a respondent. These exit interviews are given to
proxies, often relatives of the deceased, and represent a condensed version
of the normal AHEAD interview. In addition, detailed questions were
asked about the nature and costs associated with any illnesses and other
death-related expenses, and about the distribution and values of estates
and inheritances. Exit interviews are available for 774 persons who were
respondents in wave 1 but who died between wave 1 and wave 2.5 In this
section, we summarize data from these AHEAD exit interviews. Our anal-
ysis focuses on what happened to wealth as measured in wave 1, and how
prior-wave household wealth corresponds to the values of estates.
11.4.1 The Cost of Illness Associated with Death
Decedents in the AHEAD age range may leave no bequests because of
large expenses associated with their deaths. Many of the AHEAD respon-
dents who died between the waves died as a result of frequent and severe
illnesses. For example, according to the exit interviews, 82 percent of the
decedents were hospitalized at least once between their wave 1 interviews
and the time of death. Many of these hospitalizations involved multiple
visits. Even if the hospitalization associated with the death of the respon-
dent is excluded, more than 40 percent of respondents had three or more
hospital visits during this time interval. The median number of nights
spent in the hospital was thirteen days, but one in twenty respondents
spent seventy days or more in a hospital. The intensity and expense of
the medical care provided during these visits was dramatic. Half of those
hospitalized receivedi ntensive care,a nd 30 percent were on life support.
Thet o tal costs of providing such care were substantial. As reported in
the exit interviews, median total costs were about $25 thousand, and one
in nine of the deceased had medical expenses in excess of $100,000. For
the purposes of relating wave 1 wealth to bequests, however, out-of-pocket
366 Michael D. Hurd and James P. Smith6. Following the normal procedures used in HRS and AHEAD, if respondents initially
did not provide an exact dollar amount, they were allowed (encouraged) to answer using a
sequence of bracketed categories. We used within-bracket values for exact-amount respon-
dents to impute values within these brackets.
costs, not total costs, are relevant. The exit interviews aimed to measure
all out-of-pocket expenses associated with these illnesses. Out-of-pocket
costs were queried separately for hospital and nursing home visits, hospice,
doctor and dental payments, drugs, in-home need care or special facilities
or services,a nd other health care expenses. In each case, the lead-in ques-
tion asks whether the care was fully or partially insured with follow-up
questionsa bout the sum of out-of-pocket cost involved.6
Thep roxyr e spondents report that 68 percent of AHEAD decedents
had fully insured hospital costs and that another 30 percent had partially
insured costs. Fifty-two percent of nursing home costs were fully insured
while another 30 percent were partially paid for through insurance. Most
doctor visits were also reimbursed (61 percent totally reimbursed and 38
percent partially covered), leaving drugs as the principal personal ﬁnan-
cial exposure. One-third of the AHEAD decedents had to pay their full
drug costs and another 39 percent paid at least part of these expenses. The
magnitude of these out-of-pocket expenses and their implication for the
value of estates is discussed in the next section.
11.4.2 Estates
Table 11.1 shows the distribution of values of estates as reported by the
proxy respondents. Because the interpretation of what is labeled inheri-
tances depends on whether there remains a surviving spouse, these distri-
butionsa re provided separately for married and nonmarried families. One
in ﬁve of the deceased AHEAD respondents had estates of no value. Mir-
Table 11.1 Distribution of Estates (thousands of dollars): AHEAD Decedents
Percentile Single Married All
5 0.0 0.0 0.0
10 0.0 0.0 0.0
20 0.0 2.0 0.0
30 2.0 20.0 10.0
40 20.0 35.0 30.8
50 33.3 50.0 50.0
60 50.0 100.0 54.4
70 77.0 150.0 100.0
80 125.1 150.0 150.0
90 180.0 200.0 188.5
95 250.0 400.0 322.7
98 600.0 600.0 600.0
Note: N  774.
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of estate values are similarly quite dispersed and highly skewed. The mean
estate value is $94,469, but the median is half as much, $50,000. Some
respondents leave relatively large estates: Thirty percent are $100,000 or
more and 7 percent are in excess of $200,000. Only 3 percent of the estates
were valued at $600,000 or more, which is the lower limit for estates to be
subject to the estate tax. Consequently, estate tax records are extremely
incomplete and they give a very distorted picture of bequests and the attri-
butes of households who bequeath. For example, the 774 AHEAD de-
ceased respondents left bequests worth more than $73 million, but only
one-fourth of that value would appear in estate tax ﬁles.
In addition to estate records, some analyses of bequests rely on informa-
tion from wills that pass through probate. While the selectivity of such
cases is not as extreme as those that use estate tax record data, probated
wills also represent a selective sample. Only one-third of AHEAD dece-
dents had probated wills and the average value of those estates was $130.4
thousand; yet those estates that were not probated averaged just $51.9
thousand. Therefore, analyses based on probated wills cannot describe
average bequest behavior in the population.
Because the maximum time span between wave 1 and the death of the
decedent was two years, the value of the estate should be closely related
to household wealth as measured in wave 1. If it were not, at least on
average, we would be skeptical of the validity of the reports on the estate
in the exit interview. Of course, there could be expenditures between wave
1a nd the death that would reduce the correspondence. Figure 11.4 has a
schematic of the leakages that may occur. Some wealth may be used to
Fig. 11.4 The ﬂow of wealth
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of dollars): AHEAD Decedents
Single Married All
Wave1w e alth 80.7 184.7 130.2
Wave1w e alth excluding housing 42.4 104.8 72.1
Value of estate at death 80.6 109.8 94.5
Total out-of-pocket costs 9.3 9.4 9.4
Medical 3.7 4.6 4.2
Death expenses 4.4 4.1 4.3
Other 1.2 0.6 0.9
Note: N  774.
payf or medical and other expenses associated with the death; some to
give inter vivos transfers, perhaps to compensate for help received ort o
escape taxation; some to ﬁnance household consumption of the deceased
and other family members. Only the remainder is available for the estate.
Table 11.2 compares estate values and wave 1 household wealth of the
deceased AHEAD respondents. On average, wave 1 wealth was $130.2
thousand, and the estates averaged $94.5 thousand. However, in married
households, the estate is quite close to nonhousing wealth, suggesting that
when there is a surviving spouse, the house (presumably jointly owned) is
often not included in the estate. When there is no surviving spouse, mean
estate values are virtually identical to prior-wave total household wealth.
We consider the close correspondence of wave 1 wealth to estate value as
good evidence of the validity of the estate reports by the proxy respon-
dents.
The secondp a r to ft h et a b l eshows costs associated with the death of
the AHEAD wave 1 respondent. Although substantial on an absolute
scale, these costs are not particularly large relative to average wave 1
wealth. For all households, death costs are about 5 percent of wave 1
household wealth and about 10 percent of the estate. On average, death
expenses by themselves did not lead to a signiﬁcant depletion of household
wealth; nor can these death expenses account for much of the diﬀerence
between wave 1 wealth and estate values.
Another source of leakage is that during this time period, households
may have been engaging in higher amounts of inter vivos transfers than
usual to avoid estate taxation. The exit interviews inquired about the ex-
tent and amount of such transfers. There is a legitimate question about
the ability of proxy interviews to answer accurately questions about these
before-death transfers; nonetheless, the fraction of cases in which these
transfers occurred was relatively small. Transfers to children were made in
roughly 10 percent of all these households with a median transfer of about
$900 (not shown), and few households appear to have given transfers that
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clude that although there is some inter vivos giving before death for the
average household, it is minor relative to the size of the estate.
Table 11.2 suggests that estate values as reported by proxy respondents
arer easonably accurate on average. We can informally validate them fur-
ther by investigating whether estate values vary in an appropriate way with
covariates known to be related to wealth. Because many households leave
no estate at all, we estimate the eﬀects of covariates in two stages. The ﬁrst
is a probit speciﬁcation for the probability that an estate is positive, and
the second is an ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation for the log value
of the estate conditional on its being positive.
Ther e sults in table 11.3 are similar to estimates of the determinants of
wealth. Higher education is associated with a greater probability of a posi-
tive estate and with a higher value of the estate. Similarly, income has an
important positive impact both on the probability of leaving any estate
and on the value of the estate, although the elasticity is less than unity.
African American and Hispanic households have lower probabilities of
leaving an estate, but do not appear to diﬀer from white households in the
amount of money that is left in an estate. Since household income is con-
trolled for in both models, any remaining race- and ethnicity-speciﬁc be-
havioral diﬀerentials associated with bequest-leaving behavior appear to
rest largely in whether a bequest is left at all.
Inheritances are smaller in families in which there is a surviving spouse,
an indication that some fraction of family wealth is simply kept by the
surviving spouse without passing through the estate or being labeled an
inheritance. In the theory outlined in the previous section, we suggested
that one way of evaluating whether a bequest motive existed was to exam-
ine whether bequests are related to the existence and number of close rela-
tives. None of the family-structure variables (the number of living chil-
dren, grandchildren, or great-grandchildren; the number of living siblings)
has any signiﬁcant relation to the size of the inheritance. This ﬁnding is
consistent with what is found in studies based on wealth data: At older
ages, changes in wealth as individuals age are unrelated to the number of
children (Hurd 1987, 1989). The only signiﬁcant eﬀecti so nthe probability
of having an estate: Increasing the number of children reduces the proba-
bility, which is not a result that would be predicated by a bequest motive
for saving.
11.5 Anticipated Bequests
Information about the relative importance of bequests and the reasons
for making them can be obtained either by studying the value of inheri-
tances receivedb ythe current generation or by studying what that genera-
tion plans to bequeath. Studying anticipated bequests has many advan-
370 Michael D. Hurd and James P. Smithtages because it relates directly to the motives for current saving decisions
of households. However, it is diﬃcult to infer bequest intentions from cur-
rent household decisions about wealth accumulation, because other saving
motives coexist and actual bequest realizations may take place far in the
future. Many subsequent events may break the link between current inten-
tionsa nd future reality.
Ap romising new way of obtaining insight into the existence and
Table 11.3 Determinants of Estate
Logarithm of Estate
Probability of a among Positive
Positive Estate Estates
Education
Less than high school — —
——










Household income (log, thousands) 0.220 0.596
(2.23) (4.23)
Surviving spouse 0.231 	0.931
(0.92) (2.47)
Death expenses (thousands) 0.012 0.009
(1.93) (0.11)
Number of living children 	0.050 	0.063
(1.52) (1.13)
Number of grandchildren 	0.003 0.008
(0.24) (0.30)
Number of great-grandchildren 0.006 	0.018
(0.42) (0.60)
Number of living siblings 0.041 	0.022
(1.38) (0.57)
Parents dead 0.245 0.311
(1.53) (1.19)





Notes: Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. Probability coeﬃcients are from probit estima-
tion.
Anticipated and Actual Bequests 371strength of bequest motives relies on the subjective probability of leaving
ab equest, which was ascertained in HRS waves 2 and 3 and in AHEAD
waves1and 2. Although there is some diﬀerence in the wording, as be-
tween HRS and AHEAD, the substance is illustrated by the question from
AHEAD wave 2:
Using a number between 0 and 100 what are the chances that you (or
your husband/wife/partner) will leave an inheritance of at least $10,000?
Ther espondent had previously been instructed to interpret zero as abso-
lutely no chance and 100 as absolutely certain. If the answer was 31 or
higher, the question was repeated but with a target of $100,000. In the case
of couples, each spouse was asked these questions independently so that
within-family comparisons can be made.
We will use the subjective probability of leaving a bequest as our mea-
sure of anticipated bequests. In prior work, Smith (1999a) established
someo fthe properties in cross-section of the subjective probabilities by
relating them to wealth and other characteristics. As an example of his
ﬁndings, table 11.4 has the average subjective bequest probabilities in
AHEAD wave 1 and HRS wave 1 for each decile of wealth. The average
subjective bequest probabilities are sharply lower when the target is
$100,000 rather than $10,000, and the diﬀerences are not proportionate.
For example, in the top decile the diﬀerence in probabilities is 15 percent-
age points (AHEAD),whereas thediﬀerence inthe 5thdecile is46 percent-
age points. In the lowest decile the probabilities are both essentially zero.
At both target levels and in both surveys the average bequest probability
increases monotonically and sharply with wealth. Although in the very
topd eciles there are no large diﬀerences between HRS and AHEAD, the




Decile AHEAD HRS AHEAD HRS
10 90 92 75 78
98 3 8 75 66 6
87 7 8 54 45 7
77 1 8 13 44 9
66 5 7 81 84 1
55 6 7 21 03 0
44 0 6 7 7 2 2
33 0 5 6 5 1 4
21 3 4 6 2 1 1
14 2 517
Source: Smith (2001).
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ample, the average over the bottom half of the wealth distribution is 29
percent for the target of $10,000 for AHEAD but 53 percent for HRS. For
at arget of $100,000 the averages are 5 percent and 17 percent, respectively.
This is reasonable because the HRS cohort has more wealth than the
AHEAD cohort, and many in the HRS cohort are still working—and at
the ages at which their saving rates will be at a maximum. The implication
of this diﬀerence between the AHEAD and HRS cohorts is that we can
expect bequests to rise over time.
11.5.1 Predictive Validity of the Subjective Bequest Probabilities
Because observations on subjective bequest probabilities have not pre-
viously been available, they have not been subject to scrutiny about their
properties and their predictive power. Therefore, it is reasonable to wonder
about their validity. We will say that the subjective bequest probabilities
arev alid if they are accurate predictors of the probabilities of actual be-
quests. Once the cohort has died, the associated validity can be evaluated
by comparing the subjective bequest probabilities with actual bequests;
butb ecause the AHEAD population is aged seventy or over, it will be
many years before such a comparison isp o s s i ble. However, we can derive
at estb ased on the estates of the part of the population that died between
the waves, and on the change in the subjective bequest probabilities of the
part of the population that survived, providing a test that can be carried
outw ith just two waves of the data.
In panel, the subjective probabilities of bequests will change in response
to new information. Some individuals will have unanticipated health
changes that will aﬀect their survival chances; some will have unexpected
wealth changes, such as capital gains or losses. These kinds of events
should change the subjective bequest probabilities of the aﬀected individu-
als. However, to the extent that these events occur at the average ex ante
or anticipated rate, they do not constitute new information in the popula-
tion and, therefore, should not lead to changes in the average subjective
bequestp robabilities. At the population level, unanticipated changes in
the survival chances of the population or macro-events that systematically
lead to windfall gains or losses will change average subjective bequest
probabilities.
If we assume that there are no such macro-shocks, we can derive an
equation of motion for the average subjective bequest probability. Suppose
that the environment is stationary, so that individual anticipated wealth
paths do not change as each survivor ages. The assumption of stationarity
canb eu sed to derive a test of the validity of the subjective probabilities
of bequests. The test will be based on the relationship between the bequest
probabilities at time t, actual bequests among those who die between t and
t  1, and bequest probabilities at time t  1.
Anticipated and Actual Bequests 373Let Pt(B  b)b ethe probability at time t that bequests will be greater
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where Pt(Dt)i sthe probability of death at t,a n dPt(D  t)i sthe probability
of death at a time greater than t.
Under stationarity,
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because the anticipated wealth path is unchanging.
In a population of n individuals of age t,l e tDit  1i ft h eith person dies
at t and zero otherwise. Then (1/n) Pit(Bi  b|Dt)Pit(Dt)i sthe population
average of the ﬁrst term on the right-hand side of equation (3), and it can
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where I(x)  1i fx  0a nd 0o therwise, and s is the set of persons who
survived from t to t  1. Thus, we can approximately estimate in the panel
all of the elements of equation (4). The right-hand side is the sum of the
fraction of those who died having baseline wealth greater than b weighted
by the population mortality rate and of the average probability in wave 2
that bequests will be greater than b weighted by the population survival
rate.
This relationship should hold approximately in the panel. It requires
that the anticipated wealth path be unchanging among survivors, on the
validity of the subjective bequest probabilities as stated by decedents in
wave 1, and on the time consistency in the statements of the bequest prob-
374 Michael D. Hurd and James P. Smithabilities by survivors in wave 2. In particular, it does not require that
people consume according to the life-cycle model.
We canp erform a test of the validity of the subjective bequest probabili-
ties based on the estimated elements of equation (4). Table 11.5 shows the
average wave 1 subjective bequest probabilities among those who survived
to wave2a nd among those who died between the waves. We note that
the deceased had lower bequest probabilities, reﬂecting their lower wealth
holdings. The overall average is the left-hand side of equation (4). The
table shows the right-hand side of equation (4) as the weighted average of
bequestp robabilities among survivors and the average percent of estates
as large as the target. The diﬀerence between wave 1 and wave 2 is the
diﬀerence between the left-hand and right-hand sides of equation (4). For
both targets they are small, and comparisons with the standard errors of
the diﬀerence show that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the left-
hand and right-hand sides of equation (4) are equal. We interpret this re-
sult as evidence for the validity of the subjective bequest probabilities.
11.5.2 Changes in the Subjective Probabilities of Leaving Bequests
During the two years between waves, new information should aﬀect the
subjective bequest probabilities. Among survivors, an important piece of
information is simply that they survived. As discussed earlier, in steady-
state under the assumption of planned dissaving there should be a decrease
with age in the average subjective bequest probability: The survivors will
die at a greater age when wealth is lower. Other types of new information
would include health events that could aﬀectb oth current expenditures on
health care and future expenditures; unanticipated wealth change, such as





Average subjective probability, survivors to wave 2 58.30 28.87
Average subjective probability, decedents before wave 2 47.83 19.60
Overall average 57.38 28.05
Wave 2
Average subjective probability, survivors to wave 2 56.33 27.97
Percent of estates with wealth  target, decedents
before wave 2 73.68 36.00
Weighted averagea 57.82 28.68
Diﬀerence, wave 1 	 wave 2 	0.44 	0.63
Standard error 0.56 0.48
N 5,204 5,073
aWeightsa re survival rate (0.912) and mortality rate (0.088).
Anticipated and Actual Bequests 375capital gains from holdings of stocks and bonds; and events that would
change the anticipated consumption path, such as a change in the utility
from a bequest due to a change in the economic status of children.
Table 11.6 shows the joint distributions of the subjective probabilities
of leaving bequests for those AHEAD respondents who were interviewed
in the ﬁrst and second waves of AHEAD. The distribution of responses in
wave 1, which is shown in the right-most (All) column, has large percent-
ages at zero and at 1.0. Between waves 1 and 2, the distribution shifted
slightly toward lower probabilities of bequests; for example, 43.5 percent
in wave 1 reported a probability of 1.0 but in wave 2 just 39.1 percent re-
ported a probability of 1.0. The percentage at 0.5 or less shifted from 44.3
to 46.6. These are not large changes but they are consistent with a life-
cycle model in which individuals anticipate dissaving and when there are
nopopulation-wide shocksthataﬀectall ormostexpectationsor thatcause
unexpected wealth change.
Even so, there are examples of large changes. About 4 percent reported
probabilities of 0.0 in wave 1 and 1.0 in wave 2 for the target of $10,000,
implying a transition probability from 0.0 to 1.0 of 13 percent. The proba-
bility of reporting 0.0 in wave 2 conditional on a report of 1.0 in wave 1
wasa bout 10 percent. Such changes could, of course, be the result of large
unexpected wealth changes or of measurement error. We will investigate
later in this paper the correlates of these changes.
When the target is $100,000 we ﬁnd a modest reduction in the bequest
probabilities between the waves. For example, the percentage reporting a
probability of 1.0 declined from 18.5 to 16.2. Compared with the distribu-
Table 11.6 Distribution of Bequest Probabilities (percent): AHEAD Waves 1 and 2
Wave 2
Wave 1 0.00 0.01–0.49 0.50 0.51–0.99 1.00 All
Probability bequest  $10,000 (N  4,748)
0.00 21.6 2.0 1.7 1.3 4.1 30.7
0.01–0.49 2.0 1.3 0.8 0.9 1.0 6.0
0.50 1.7 1.1 1.5 1.1 2.3 7.6
0.51–0.99 1.2 0.9 1.9 3.9 4.2 12.2
1.00 4.4 1.3 3.2 7.1 27.5 43.5
All 30.9 6.6 9.1 14.3 39.1 100.0
Probability bequest  $100,000 (N  4,623)
0.00 52.1 3.3 2.2 1.6 2.3 61.4
0.01–0.49 2.4 1.5 0.9 0.8 0.4 6.0
0.50 2.0 0.8 1.4 1.3 1.2 6.7
0.51–0.99 1.1 0.9 1.1 2.4 1.9 7.4
1.00 2.9 1.0 1.6 2.5 10.5 18.5
All 60.6 7.5 7.2 8.5 16.2 100.1
376 Michael D. Hurd and James P. SmithTable 11.7 Distribution of Bequest Probabilities (percent): HRS Waves 2 and 3
Wave 3
Wave 2 0.00 0.01–0.49 0.50 0.51–0.99 1.00 All
Probability bequest  $10,000 (N  9,084)
0.00 10.9 1.6 1.4 1.1 3.2 18.1
0.01–0.49 2.1 1.4 1.1 1.4 1.4 7.3
0.50 1.3 1.0 2.1 2.3 3.2 9.9
0.51–0.99 1.0 1.2 2.0 7.5 7.9 19.7
1.00 2.5 1.1 2.5 6.5 32.3 44.9
All 17.8 6.3 9.2 18.6 48.0 100.0
Probability bequest  $100,000 (N  8,964)
0.00 35.4 3.5 2.1 1.6 2.6 45.2
0.01–0.49 5.3 4.0 2.0 2.1 1.4 14.7
0.50 1.6 1.5 1.9 2.1 2.0 9.1
0.51–0.99 1.4 1.2 1.6 4.2 4.1 12.5
1.00 1.7 0.9 1.5 2.6 11.9 18.5
All 45.4 11.0 9.0 12.6 22.0 100.2
tion foratarget of $10,000, there is a much greater percentage that report
ap robability of 0.0, reﬂecting the large diﬀerence between the target and
the wealth of many households.
Table 11.7 has similar results for HRS waves 2 and 3. A noticeable dif-
ference when compared with AHEAD results is that the HRS distribution
shifts toward higher subjective bequest probabilities between the waves.
Fore xample, in wave 1, 44.9 percent were certain to leave a bequest at the
$10,000 target, but in wave 2, 48.0 percent were certain. At the $100,000
target these percentages changed from 18.5 to 22.0. There are several rea-
sons for the diﬀerences between AHEAD and HRS results. The two-year
mortality rate for AHEAD was about 0.11, whereas it was only 0.02 for
HRS. Therefore, the increase in the chances of dying at advanced old age,
and therefore, of dying with less wealth, were much greater in the AHEAD
population than in the HRS population. Also, many in the HRS cohort
are still working, and in the robust economic times between waves 2 and
3( a pproximately 1994 to 1996) many likely had greater earnings than ex-
pected. Furthermore, the stock and bond markets had large capital gains,
and the HRS cohort are more heavily invested in such assets than the
AHEAD cohort.
11.5.3 Determinants of Change in Bequest Probabilities
We will study the determinants of changes in the subjective bequest
probabilities by relating them to new information—speciﬁcally, changes
in the subjective survival probabilities and in out-of-pocket medical ex-
penditures; the onset of a new health condition; changes in household in-
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new information and therefore cause a change in the subjective bequest
probabilities. We will present results from several types of estimation and
discuss them together, in that all the results pertain to the same under-
lying process.
Because tables 11.6 and 11.7 show substantial fractions of respondents
to be at the extreme of 0.0, we will study the probability of reporting a
positive probability in wave 2 conditional on reporting a probability of
zero in wave 1. That is, we will estimate  in the probit function
Pp p fX (|) ( ) , 21 00 >= = 
where f is the normal distribution function, p2 is the probability in wave 2
ofab equest at least as large as the target, and p1 is the probability in wave
1. This probit is estimated over the 1,222 observations in AHEAD wave 1
that reported p1  0w hen the target was $10,000. Similar probits are esti-
mated for the AHEAD target of $100,000 and for both targets in HRS.
Table 11.8 lists these estimated probit coeﬃcients.
Because tables 11.6 and 11.7 also show considerable bunching of re-
sponses at 1.0, we estimated probit functions for the probability of reduc-
ing bequest chances from 1.0 to chances less than 1. 0. That is, we esti-
mated  in
Pp p fX (|) ( ) 21 11 <= = 
over the 1,939 observations in AHEAD wave 1 that reported bequest
chances of 1.0 for the target of $10,000. Similar probit coeﬃcients were
estimated for a target of $100,000, and among HRS respondents for both
targets. The results are presented in table 11.9.
Our ﬁnal type of estimation is regression in which the left-hand variable
is the change in the subjective bequest probabilities and the right-hand
variables are measures of new information. Because the left-hand variable
is limited to the range of 	100 to 100, both OLS estimates and tobit esti-
mates are presented. Table 11.10 has the results for AHEAD and table
11.11 for HRS.
Several consistent patterns are revealed in these tables. First, it is rather
remarkable that the overall pattern of coeﬃcients in table 11.9 is the same
as in table 11.8 but with reversed signs. For example, in table 11.8 an
increase in the subjective survival probability is associated with an in-
crease in bequest chances; in table 11.9 it is associated with a decrease in
the probability of reducing bequest chances, or an increase in the chances
of bequests. Because the estimations are based on diﬀerent samples, the
estimates are independent. Second, this positive relationship between sur-
vival chances and bequest chances is found both for the two target levels
in AHEAD and HRS and for the several types of estimation. In tables
378 Michael D. Hurd and James P. Smith11.8–11.11, most of the coeﬃcients on the change in the own subjective
probability of survival are statistically signiﬁcant.
To judge the magnitude of the eﬀecto fo wn survivor probability, con-
sider the estimates in table 11.8 for the probability of moving from a zero
response in wave 1 to a positive in wave 2, and consider an increase in
survival chances from 0 to 100. Such a change would increase the probit
index by 0. 2. Evaluated at the average probability of a transition from 0
to positive (0.296), the predicted change is about 0.06. That is, an increase
in the subjective survival probability would increase the probability of re-
porting positive chances of a bequest from about 0.30 to 0.36. The eﬀect
at the target of $100,000 is somewhat larger, increasing the probability
of reporting positive bequest chances from 0.15 to 0.22. The changes in
probabilities for HRS would be approximately the same. These results are
in accord with the eﬀecto fthe subjective survival probability on bequest




$10,000 $100,000 $10,000 $100,000
Change in subjective survival 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002
probability (1.82) (3.11) (1.69) (2.40)
Change in subjective survival 	0.001 	0.001 0.003 0.002
probability of spouse (0.32) (0.75) (1.78) (1.37)
Out-of-pocket medical costs 0.027 0.004 0.006 	0.002
($100) (0.55) (0.11) (1.32) (0.52)






Change in household income 0.016 0.028 0.004 0.016
($10,000) (0.52) (1.40) (0.38) (2.28)
Change in household wealth 0.017 0.004 0.004 0.005
($10,000) (3.83) (1.31) (1.07) (2.24)
Widowed 0.362 0.127 	0.214 	0.174
(1.99) (0.75) (0.84) (0.92)
Retired 	0.341 0.021
(2.02) (0.21)
N 1,222 1,591 1,310 3,379
Average conditional probability 0.296 0.153 0.401 0.217
Notes: Entries are estimated eﬀects (probit coeﬃcients) on the probability that a bequest will
be positive given that the prior-wave probability was zero. Absolute t-statistics in parenthe-
ses. Includes controls for race, sex, ethnicity, education, region of residence, and birth cohort.
Anticipated and Actual Bequests 379probabilities among decedents (as shown later in table 11.15; in that table,
those with higher subjective survival chances anticipated a smaller reduc-
tion in wealth before death).
As explained above, without any behavioral responses an increase in
survival chances makes a large accidental bequest early in life less likely.
However, individuals may react to their improved survival chances by re-
ducing their current consumption so as to ﬁnance consumption over a
longer lifetime, and the resulting larger wealth holdings would make be-
quests more likely. Our estimates indicate that the behavioral reactions
dominate and that changes in bequests and survival probabilities are posi-
tively related.
Because the unit of observation is the individual, each spouse provides
an observation on his or her subjective bequest probability and on his or
her subjective survival probability. The estimates show that, especially in
Table 11.9 Probits That the Probability of a Bequest is Less Than 1.0 Given
Prior-Wave Probability of 1.0
Target Amounts
AHEAD HRS
$10,000 $100,000 $10,000 $100,000
Change in subjective survival 	0.002 0.000 	0.003 	0.004
probability (1.88) (0.07) (2.98) (2.56)
Change in subjective survival 	0.002 	0.001 0.002 0.002
probability of spouse (1.52) (0.51) (1.51) (0.98)
Out-of-pocket medical costs 0.024 0.048 	0.001 	0.006
($100) (0.71) (1.04) (0.16) (1.22)






Change in household income 0.024 0.023 0.001 0.001
($10,000) (0.76) (0.73) (0.37) (0.40)
Change in household wealth 	0.036 	0.035 	0.001 	0.002
($10,000) (4.33) (3.83) (1.63) (2.02)
Widowed 	0.059 	0.162 	0.279 	0.217
(0.40) (0.72) (1.27) (0.66)
Retired 0.017 	0.072
(0.21) (0.59)
N 1,939 827 3,528 1,468
Average conditional probability 0.368 0.432 0.281 0.360
Notes: Entries are estimated eﬀects (probit coeﬃcients) on the probability that a bequest
will be less than 1.0 given that the prior-wave probability was 1.0. Absolute t-statistics in
parentheses. Includes controls for race, sex, ethnicity, education, region of residence, and
birth cohort.
380 Michael D. Hurd and James P. SmithAHEAD, the eﬀects of changes in the spouse’s subjective probability of
survival are small and often have no consistent pattern. This is to be ex-
pected. For example, a wife can give information about her own survival
probabilities and how they aﬀect her own bequest probabilities, yet not be
awareo fher husband’s assessment of his own survival probabilities. Thus,
were he to lower his subjective survival probabilities, the wife might not
alter her bequest probabilities even though the subjective survivorship of
the household would be lower. The estimates suggest this scenario.
There are two other health-related measures in these models: out-of-
pocket medical expenses and the onset of new health conditions in the
household. Out-of-pocket medical expenses had little eﬀect on the tran-
sitionsf rom 0.0 or from 1.0 (tables 11.8 and 11.9), but they reduced the
average change in bequest probabilities (tables 11.10 and 11.11). In
AHEAD, for example, out-of-pocket expenditures of $10,000 are esti-
mated to reduce the probability of a bequest at the $10,000 target by about
1.5 percentage points. Of course, a considerable amount of the variation
in health costs is likely to be anticipated because of their ongoing nature.
If that were fully the case they would not be associated with any revision
in bequest chances.
Theo nset of new health conditions has no consistent aﬀect on revisions
Table 11.10 Change in the Probability (percent) of a Bequest: AHEAD
Target Amounts
OLS Tobit
$10,000 $100,000 $10,000 $100,000
Change in subjective survival 0.085 0.065 0.090 0.097
probability (4.48) (3.97) (4.34) (4.01)
Change in subjective survival 0.020 	0.051 0.021 	0.024
probability of spouse (0.66) (1.97) (0.66) (0.69)
Out-of-pocket medical costs 	0.145 	0.105 	0.155 	0.083
($1,000) (1.98) (1.67) (1.95) (0.94)
New health condition 	0.246 	0.472 	0.287 	1.038
(0.18) (0.39) (0.19) (0.62)
Change in household income 0.003 0.006 	0.028 0.018
($10,000) (0.03) (0.08) (0.03) (0.21)
Change in household wealth 0.038 0.030 0.040 0.023
($10,000) (2.25) (2.05) (2.32) (1.33)
Widowed 1.730 0.370 4.810 1.610
(0.55) (0.37) (1.42) (0.42)
N 4,211 4,119 4,211 4,119
Notes: Entries are estimated eﬀects on the change in the probability that a bequest will be at
least as large as the target amount. Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. Subjective survival
probability scaled 0–100. Includes controls for race, sex, ethnicity, education, region of resi-
dence, and birth cohort. OLS  ordinary least squares.
Anticipated and Actual Bequests 3817. In HRS, new onsets are separated into severe and mild new onsets. Previous research
has shown that there is not yet enough data to make this distinction in AHEAD, so that all
new onsets are combined in that data. See Smith (1999b) for a discussion of these issues.
in bequest probabilities, suggesting that survivor probabilities and out-of-
pocket medical expenses may be the two principal mechanisms through
which unexpected health events alter expected bequests.7
The eﬀecto fwidowing is likely to increase bequest chances in AHEAD.
Thed eath of a spouse reduces needs for consumption relative to wealth,
so that the death acts like an increase in wealth. Such an increase will
increase bequests. At the same time, however, the death reduces life expec-
tancy of the household. According to the theory, this reduction has an
ambiguous eﬀecto nb equests, and according to our estimates it has a small
eﬀect. The sum of the two eﬀects is likely to be to increase bequests.
In HRS these eﬀects are dampened. Wealth is increased relative to
needs, but the surviving spouse has many years in which to consume the
Table 11.11 Change in the Probability (percent) of a Bequest: HRS
Target Amounts
OLS Tobit
$10,000 $100,000 $10,000 $100,000
Change in subjective survival 0.085 0.065 0.088 0.067
probability (5.95) (4.72) (5.83) (4.71)
Change in subjective survival 0.024 0.037 0.027 0.039
probability of spouse (1.16) (1.82) (1.22) (1.84)
Out-of-pocket medical costs 	0.107 	0.105 	0.109 	0.107
($1,000) (2.00) (2.01) (1.93) (2.02)
New health condition
Minor 	1.292 0.760 	1.308 0.763
(1.23) (0.75) (1.19) (0.73)
Major 0.797 	0.998 0.938 	1.114
(0.61) (0.79) (0.62) (0.85)
Change in household income 0.047 0.142 0.052 0.150
($10,000) (0.97) (3.04) (1.02) (3.10)
Change in household wealth 0.021 0.041 0.021 0.041
($10,000) (1.72) (3.38) (1.68) (3.35)
Widowed 11.980 8.710 12.500 9.230
(3.50) (2.64) (3.46) (2.69)
Retired 	2.990 	0.148 	3.090 	0.177
(1.95) (0.10) (1.92) (0.11)
N 7,735 7,645 7,735 7,645
Notes: Entries are estimated eﬀects on the change in the probability that a bequest will be at
least as large as the target amount. Absolute t-statistics in parentheses. Subjective survival
probability scaled 0–100. Includes controls for race, sex, ethnicity, education, region of resi-
dence, and birth cohort. OLS  ordinary least squares.
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9. The regressions include the other covariates listed in table 11.11.
increase in wealth before mortality risk becomes substantial. Said diﬀer-
ently, the surviving spouse can consume most of the increase rather than
bequeathing it. Furthermore, in HRS most men are still working, so wid-
owing is typically associated with an unanticipated loss of future earnings.
The overall eﬀect isl i k e l yt ob ear e d u c t ion in bequests.
Although no coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, the pattern in AHEAD is con-
sistent with this reasoning: Widowing is associated with an increase in
bequestp robabilities.8 In the HRS, however, this reasoning is not sup-
ported. The only consistent pattern of signiﬁcant coeﬃcients is in table
11.11, which shows that widowing is also associated with an increase in the
bequestp robabilities. Apparently the reduction in need for consumption
dominates the loss of human capital.
In the AHEAD population, changes in household income have little
eﬀecte i ther on the transition probabilities or on the change in bequest
probabilities. This is not surprising in view of the predictability of most
AHEAD income sources, such as pension and Social Security income. A
change in household income has an impact in the HRS sample at the
$100,000 bequest target, possibly a reﬂection that some income changes
were unexpected, due, for example, to better-than-anticipated salary in-
creases.
Increases in household wealth are consistently associated with increases
in the probability of bequests. This positive relationship is found both in
the probits and in the expected changes in bequest probabilities. Yet the
magnitude of this eﬀecti sn ot large. For example, an increase of $100,000
should increase substantially the chances of leaving a bequest of $10,000;
yet the predicted eﬀecti nAHEAD would be an increase from 0.30 to 0.35.
The eﬀects on the other targets are even smaller. Of course, some of the
observed wealth change in the panel mayh ave been anticipated, which
would explain the smaller eﬀect.
As we have already discussed, only unanticipated wealth change should
change anticipated bequests; yet in general we have no method for separat-
ing unanticipated from anticipated wealth change. However, HRS has a
series of questionsa bout new purchases and sales of stocks. We will say
that the diﬀerence between the total change in the value of stock holdings
and net new investments in stocks is unanticipated capital gains (Smith
2001). Total anticipated ﬁnancial wealth change will then be total ﬁnancial
wealth change less unanticipated capital gains.
Table 11.12 summarizes the results of using these variables in estimation
over the HRS sample.9 Compared with previous tables and with the eﬀects
associated with anticipated wealth change, unanticipated capital gains
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large gains have a high likelihood of continuing to state that their bequest
probability is 1. 0. Compared with the target of $10,000, the diﬀerential
eﬀecti sp robably due to large capital gains being concentrated among the
relatively well-to-do, who are certain to give a bequest of $10,000 regard-
lesso fc apital gains.
In summary, we have shown in this section that at the individual level,
subjective probabilities of bequests change with changes in covariates in a
manner that is consistent with the predictions about actual bequests based
on ourm odel of consumption and saving. These results are consistent with
the view that the subjective bequest probabilities are valid predictors of
actual bequest probabilities.
11.6 Subjective Bequest Probabilities as an Index of Saving Intentions
Equation (4) in section 11.5 gives a relationship among the subjective
bequestp robabilities at wave 1, actual bequests by decedents between the
waves, and subjective bequest probabilities by the survivors in wave 2. It
can also be used, however, to show how the subjective bequest probabili-
ties contain information about what the cohort anticipates bequeathing,
and, when combined with actual wealth holdings, what the cohort antici-
pates saving or dissaving.
Suppose that in equation (4) t refers to the present time period and t 
1t othe greatest age possible. Everyone dies shortly after t,a n dthe set d
would be the entire baseline population and the set s would be empty. Then
in equation (4) the second term on the right-hand side would be zero and
the ﬁrst term would be the fraction of the population that had actual be-
quests greater than b.T herefore, the average of the subjective bequest
probabilities predicts the fraction of actual bequests greater than b.E q u i v -
alently, the average of the subjective bequest probabilities gives a point on
the distribution of the bequests the cohort will actually make. We can
Table 11.12 Change in the Probability of a Bequest: HRS
Target Amounts
Tobit Estimatesa Probit Estimatesb
$10,000 $100,000 $10,000 $100,000
Financial capital gains 0.007 0.003 	0.004 	0.008
(0.32) (1.46) (2.62) (5.24)
Other ﬁnancial wealth change 0.045 0.082 0.002 	0.003
(1.08) (2.05) (0.80) (1.49)
Note: Capital gains and wealth change in $10,000.
aExpected value.
bP(p2  1|p1  1)
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and Subjective Bequest Probabilities: AHEAD
Target Amounts
$10,000 $100,000
Wave1w e alth 84.9 52.6
Average subjective bequest probability 57.4 28.1
N 5,204 5,073
compare this point with an appropriate point from the distribution of ac-
tual wealth holdings to learn about anticipated or intended saving or dis-
saving by the cohort. This result will be used to ﬁnd whether the AHEAD
population anticipates dissaving before death by comparing points on the
distribution of wealth with subjective bequest probabilities.
There are a number of important reasons for wanting to establish
whether the elderly are dissaving. If they do dissave, their control of eco-
nomic resources will decline with age and, should they survive to advanced
olda ge, they may be poor. Dissaving implies that they will bequeath less
than their current wealth to the next generation. In that the elderly own
substantial amounts of assets, dissaving by them will reduce the national
household saving rate. Finally, anticipations of saving would be strong evi-
dence for a bequest motive: A major implication of the pure life-cycle
model (no bequest motive) is that wealth should decline with age among
those of suﬃcient age.
Estimation of anticipated or desired saving behavior based on the sub-
jective bequest probabilities has advantages over tests based on actual
wealth change in panels that span just a few years. Unanticipated capital
gains at the macro-level can cause observed wealth change to diﬀer from
anticipated wealth change over most households in a sample. The subjec-
tive probabilities of bequests take into account rates of return over long
time periods, so that average rates of return would be closer to normal.
Table 11.13 shows, for the AHEAD baseline sample, the fraction of
persons with wave 1 wealth at least as large as the target and the average
of the subjective bequest probabilities. For example, in wave 1, 84.9 per-
cent had wealth at least as large as $10,000, yet on average only 57.4 per-
cent of households will die with bequests that large. That is, $10,000 is ap-
proximately the 15th percentile point in the distribution of wave 1 wealth
but, under the assumption that the expectations about bequests are real-
ized, it will be the 43rd percentile in the distribution of bequests. Similarly,
$100,000 is approximately the 47th percentile in the wave 1 wealth distri-
bution but the 72nd percentile of the bequest distribution. The implication
is that the AHEAD population anticipates substantial dissaving before
death.
These results are consistent with the average change in the subjective
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of missing data on the subjective survival probabilities.
bequestp robabilities among survivors as reported in table 11.5. The aver-
ageb equest probability at the $10,000 target declined by 1.97 percentage
points with standard error of 0.58. At the $100,000 target the probability
declined by 0.90 percentage points with standard error of 0.49 (p-value of
0.06). Declining subjective bequest probabilities are consistent with in-
tended dissaving.
The decedents diﬀered at baseline somewhat from the full sample, but
they also planned to dissave before dying. Table 11.14 shows the percent
of decedents that had wave 1 wealth at least as large as the target amounts,
the percent with actual estates at least as large as the target amounts, and
their average subjective bequest probabilities.10 Theirw e alth was smaller
than the average of the entire sample both because of their greater age and
also because of diﬀerential mortality: The less well-to-do die sooner than
the wealthy. At the $10,000 target the average of their subjective bequest
probability was 47.8, which implies that had the decedents lived and con-
sumed as they had anticipated when they responded in wave 1, about 48
percent of them would have died with estates at least as large as $10,000.
Yeta bout 75 percent had wave 1 wealth at least as large as $10,000, and
74 percent had actual estates that reached $10,000. The implication is that
the group planned or anticipated that they would decumulate wealth be-
fore dying. Because they died unexpectedly early, they were not able to de-
cumulate.
As discussed in section 11.2, the life-cycle model makes no prediction
about the response of bequests to a change in mortality risk: If there were
no behavioral response to an increase in risk, bequests would increase be-
cause, under the assumption of wealth decumulation, people would die
earlier when their wealth was higher. If there were a strong behavioral re-
sponse, consumption could initially increase so much that actual bequests
would fall due to lower wealth holdings. The net eﬀectc o uld be either an
increase or a decrease in bequests, so the actual eﬀect must be found from
Table 11.14 Percent of Decedents with Wealth or Estates At Least As Large As
Target Amounts and Average Subjective Bequest Probability: AHEAD
Target Amounts
$10,000 $100,000
Wave1w e alth 75.0 38.0
Actual estates 73.7 36.0
Average subjective bequest probability 47.8 19.6
N 456 450
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we compare wealth of the household in which the individual lives to bequest probabilities.
Thus, both the husband and the wife appear as separate entries in table 11.13.
data. Similar reasoning shows that variation across individuals in their
perceived mortality risk does not produce a deﬁnite predication about the
variation in bequests.
Table 11.15 shows the percentage of individuals whose wave 1 wealth
reached the target amounts and their average subjective bequest probabil-
ity classiﬁed by the subjective survival probability in wave 1.11 Among
respondents who reported a subjective survival probability of 0–10 percent
in wave 1, 75 percent had wealth that reached $10,000. Their average sub-
jective bequest probability was about 49 percent, and the diﬀerence was
about2 6p ercent. Among those with subjective survival probabilities of
90 to 100, wave 1 wealth was slightly lower, the average subjective bequest
probability was about the same, and the diﬀerence between them was
about 24 percent. Thed i ﬀerence is about the same for the $100,000 target.
These results show that greater subjective survival probabilities have
small but positive eﬀects on anticipated bequests. The results are in accord
with the eﬀecto fachange in the subjective survival probability on bequest
probabilities as shown in tables 11.6–11.9. In those tables, individuals who
assessed that their survival chances had increased between the waves in-
creased their probabilities of bequests.
In table 11.15, those with high subjective survival chances anticipated
that their bequests would be somewhat larger than the bequests of those
with low survival chances even though the wealth of the two groups was
about the same. An implication is that the ﬁrst group anticipated less dis-
saving than the second in order to reach their expected bequests despite
their greater expected lifetimes. This implies a rather large behavioral re-
sponse to mortality risk, which is in accord with estimates based on actual
rates of dissaving in panel (Hurd 1993): Were the behavioral response min-
Table 11.15 Percent of Decedents with Wealth or Estates At Least As Large As
Target Amounts and Average Subjective Bequest Probability: AHEAD
Subjective Survival Probability
Target Amount Target Amount
$10,000 $100,000
0–10 90–100 0–10 90–100
Wave1w e alth 75.2 73.3 37.6 43.3
Average subjective probability 49.4 49.6 19.8 26.7
Diﬀerence 25.8 23.7 17.8 16.6
Note: N  371.
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quests.
11.7 Conclusions
We have presented results about the magnitude and distribution of be-
quests based on new methods of measuring actual and anticipated be-
quests. Actual bequests were measured in exit interviews given by proxy
respondents for 774 AHEAD respondents who died between waves 1 and
2o fthe AHEAD survey. Among other things, these exit interviews provide
data about the medical and nonmedical costs associated with the illnesses
of the deceased respondents and the value and distribution of their estates.
Even though the deceased were quite ill before they died, medical expenses
did not cause a substantial reduction in their estates. Because the exit in-
terview obtainedinformationaboutestatesthatisrepresentativeofthepop-
ulation, the distribution of these estate values is quite diﬀerent than one
would suppose from estate records, which are obtained for only a wealthy
subset of the population.
Anticipated bequests were measured in two waves of HRS and AHEAD
by the subjective probability of leaving bequests. We studied the reasons
forb etween-wave revisions of the subjective bequest probabilities. We
found that increases in the subjective probability of surviving, in incre-
ments in household wealth, and in widowing were all associated with in-
creases in bequest probabilities, whereas out-of-pocket medical expenses
reduced the likelihood of a bequest. By comparing bequest probabilities
with baseline wealth we were able to test a main prediction of the life-cycle
model, that individuals will dissave at advanced old age. The AHEAD
respondents anticipate substantial dissaving before they die.
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Comment David Laibson
Hurd and Smith have made three very important contributions to the life-
cycle literature. First, they have documented the usefulness and high qual-
ityo fb equest data (anticipated and actual bequests) from the Asset and
Health Dynamics among the Oldest Old (AHEAD) survey and Health
and Retirement Survey (HRS) panels. Second, they have used this data
to analyze the life-cycle hypothesis. Third, they have powerfully critiqued
standard theories of bequest motives. I will discuss each of these contribu-
tions.
The Bequest Data: Anticipated and Actual Bequests
The author’s analysis of the data on anticipated bequests suggests that
these data are reliable. Four observations support this claim. First, antici-
pated bequests covary positively with income and wealth. Second, mea-
surements of anticipated bequests are relatively stable between survey
waves. Third, anticipated bequests are good predictors of actual bequests
(as measured in exit interviews with the decedents’ families). Finally, the
anticipated bequest variable evolves over time in ways that are consistent
with rational expectations. For example, predictable information, such as
changes in income for retired adults, does not aﬀect anticipated bequests.
Anticipated and Actual Bequests 3891. The consumers in this population are all close to retirement or already retired.
Moreover, unpredictable information, such as capital gains, does aﬀect
anticipated bequests. In addition, anticipated bequests appear to follow
dynamics (from wave to wave) that are consistent with Bayes’ rule.
Thed atao nactual bequests is particularly useful because we have no
close substitutes for this new data source. Most preexisting evidence on
bequests comes from estate tax records and wills ﬁled in probate courts;
but these preexisting data sources are incomplete. Only a small fraction of
estates are large enough (the threshold for the estate tax is $600,000) to
appear in the tax ﬁles and few wills pass through probate court. Hurd and
Smith’s evidence suggests that only 2 percent of estates are valued at more
than $600,000. Even on a dollar-weighted basis, only one-fourth of the
bequests in the HRS and AHEAD samples are worth more than $600,000.
Hence, the Hurd and Smith bequest data—which include all bequests—
represents a very important step forward for the bequest literature.
AT est of the Lifecycle Hypothesis
Hurd and Smith’s empirical analysis shows that anticipated bequests
fall with age.1 This ﬁnding sheds light on the ongoing debate about whether
wealth falls with age (after retirement). An age-related fall in an antici-
pated bequest implies that wealth is probably also falling. Of course, fall-
ing wealth is a central prediction of the life-cycle hypothesis (LCH).
Hence, Hurd and Smith interpret postretirement declines in anticipated
bequests as evidence of the LCH.
Ia muncomfortable with this conclusion. First, the authors have not
shown that the fall in wealth has the same magnitude as predicted by the
LCH. They have shown only that the sign is right. Second, they do not
acknowledge that almost every sensible theory of life-cycle decision mak-
ing—whether rational and optimal or not—implies that wealth and antici-
pated bequests will fall with age (after retirement). Consider, for example,
the myopic mental accounting rule: Consume 90 percent of your current
labor/pension/Social Security income and 20 percent of your ﬁnancial
wealth. Such nonoptimal consumption rules also generate declining
wealth during retirement.
Evidence on the Bequest Motive
Hurd and Smith’s analysis provides new evidence against the leading
economic theory of the bequest motive. Speciﬁcally, they show that 79
percent of bequests are split evenly among the children, contradicting any
theory that requires that the bequest be chosen to equate the marginal
utility of consumption across children. In addition, Hurd and Smith show
that bequests do not depend on the number of children, another result
that seems to violate economists’ intuitions about the underlying mecha-
390 Michael D. Hurd and James P. Smithnisms that drive bequest choices. These strong results may be mitigated by
inter vivos wealth transfers, but the results nevertheless indicate important
departures from the classical economic theory of bequests.
There are several sensible economic and psychological reasons that be-
quests may be equal across children. First, the bequest decision necessarily
creates a moral hazard problem if parents try to use bequests to equate
marginal utilities of their children at the time of the parent’s death. Spe-
ciﬁcally, children with siblings have an incentive to raise and thereby dis-
tort their own consumptions while their parents are still alive. Children
whoo v erconsume early in life will have low consumption during midlife,
raising their marginal utility at exactly the time that their parents are mak-
ing the bequest decision. The relative poverty of overspending children
will in turn lead their parents to transfer bequests to them, away from sib-
lings who didnot overspend. To avoid this incentivefor competitive impov-
erishment,parentsshouldrationallycommitnottoequatemarginalutilities
through bequests (Gatti 1998). Moreover, parents may want to commit to
reward children who “do the right thing” (e.g., get a law degree). This
motive along with parental concern about the moral hazard problem may
partially or fully oﬀset the motive to help children with relatively bad luck
or low consumption.
Equal bequests are also predicted by prospect theory and loss aversion
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979). An even split is a natural reference point,
and deviations from this norm may help the winners less than the hurt
experienced by the losers.
It is also important to note that parents are not the only economic actors
who make transfers. Sometimes children make transfers to parents, gener-
ating a form of dynastic insurance. This may explain why increasing the
number of children does not empirically raise the magnitude of bequests
from parents to children. As a parent has more children, the parent may
have a reduced incentive to save, since the children will serve as an impor-
tant source of consumption insurance for the parent. Hence, it is not at all
clear whether the relationship between bequest value and number of chil-
dren should be positive or negative.
Hurd and Smith have provided a rich set of facts that dramatically im-
proves our understanding of lifecycle consumption and savings decisions.
Most importantly, their work highlights the counterfactual predictions of
existing models of intergenerational wealth transfers. Hopefully, their
analysis will spur the development of much-needed alternative models.
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